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ABSTRACT 
The activity of private investigations by fraud examiners is a business of lawyers, auditors and 
other professionals who investigate suspicions of financial crime by white-collar criminals. 
This article presents results from an empirical study of investigation reports. The available 
sample consists of 28 reports written mostly by auditing firms such as Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young and PwC. The blame game can occurs at two stages in a private investigation. First, 
the mandate formulated by a client may point investigators in a specific direction. Next, 
investigators sometimes suffer from a tunnel view of predetermined opinions. In the sample 
of 28 investigations reports, more than half of them involve potential blame game victims. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Financial crime; fraud examination; empirical study; blame game; private 
investigations; white-collar criminals. 
 
BIOGRAPHY 
Petter Gottschalk is Professor of Information Systems and Knowledge Management in the 
Department of Leadership and Organizational Behavior at BI Norwegian Business School, 
Oslo, Norway. Dr. Gottschalk has published extensively on organized crime, financial crime 
and law enforcement. He has been CEO of several companies, including ABB Data Cables 
and Norwegian Computing Center. He was educated in Germany (MBA at Technische 
Universität Berlin), United States (Master of Science at Dartmouth and MIT), and UK (DBA 
at Henley and Brunel University). 
 
 
1 
 
Private Investigations of White-Collar Crime Suspicions:  
A Qualitative Study of the Blame Game Hypothesis 
 
 
Introduction 
Financial crime investigation is a growing business area for law firms, auditing firms, 
consulting firms and other professional services firms. Financial crime specialists in these 
firms are investigating suspicions of corruption, insider trading, embezzlement, tax evasion 
and other kinds of financial crime. Their clients are organizations wanting to investigate facts, 
causes and responsibilities for incidents, negative events and general misconduct. Financial 
crime specialists apply intelligence, investigation, examination, analysis and hypotheses to 
establish facts and causes. They perform fact findings, causality studies, change studies and 
suspect identifications (Machen and Richards, 2004; Morgan and Nix, 2003; Wells, 2003). 
The purpose of this article is to present results from an exploratory study of private 
investigations by fraud examiners in Norway. Specifically, the purpose of this article is to 
present results from a study of investigation reports produced by law firms, auditing firms and 
other firms for clients in both the private and public sector to evaluate the blame game 
hypothesis (Eberly et al., 2011; Lee and Robinson, 2000; Shepherd et al., 2011).  
This research is important, as the business of private investigations is both challenging to and 
supportive of police work. It is challenging to police work, as evidence can be harmed and 
prosecution of criminal offences can be carried out by private actors rather than public 
authorities. A private investigator can potentially challenge the rule of law by taking on all 
three roles of police investigator, public prosecutor, and court judge. In this perspective, there 
is a danger of privatization of crime settlement between the community and the criminal.  
On the other hand, private investigations can support police work by confirming or 
disconfirming suspicions of financial crime. Private and public organizations pay the bills 
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from professional service firms to establish the facts. Police work is thus supported both in 
terms of evidence collection and resource allocation. 
The blame game hypothesis argues that the main threat to justice from private investigations 
lies in: i) the blame game occurring when the client – who pays for the work – points the 
investigator in a specific direction, and ii) the blame game occurring when the investigator 
only has one hypothesis about causality for a negative event.  
 
White-Collar Criminals 
A white-collar criminal is typically a member of the privileged socioeconomic class in society 
(Sutherland, 1940, 1949), who behaves illegally (Hansen, 2009) in non-violent acts 
committed for financial gain (Brightman, 2009; Bucy et al., 2009). The criminal is a person of 
respectability, who commits crime in a professional setting, where criminal activities are 
concealed and disguised in organizational work (Benson and Simpson, 2009; Bookman, 2009) 
by law-abiding behavior (Abadinsky, 2007). The criminal has power and influence (Kempa, 
2010; Podgor, 2009), and enjoys trust from others in privileged networks (Pickett and Pickett, 
2002).  
Furthermore, the criminal is usually independent and irresponsible, dishonest and antisocial 
(Collins and Schmidt, 1993; Listwan et al., 2010), and lacks integrity and social conscience 
(Price and Norris, 2009). The offender is likely to exhibit narcissistic behavior (McKay et al., 
2010; Ouimet, 2009, 2010) and psychopathic traits (Ragatz et al., 2012). The criminal belongs 
to the elite and is often wealthy and higher educated (Heath, 2008). The criminal may be 
subject to strain (Langton and Piquero, 2007; Piquero et al., 2010) and have low self-control 
(Gottfredsson and Hirschi, 1990). The offender has legitimate access to the location in which 
the crime is committed, and the offender’s actions have a superficial appearance of legitimacy 
(Benson and Simpson, 2009). 
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Finally, the white-collar criminal does not consider own actions as crime (Dhami, 2007; 
Siponen and Vance, 2010) and has no guilt feeling (Stadler and Benson, 2012). When the 
criminal is detected, often media coverage follows. The criminal has resources to hire a top 
white-collar attorney (Weissmann and Block, 2010). White-collar criminals are sentenced 
differently and possibly milder than street criminals (Maddan et al., 2012; Schoepfer et al., 
2007; Stadler et al., 2013), and there is a substantial gender gap (Robb, 2006; Simpson et al., 
2012; Steffensmeier et al., 2013). 
 
Private Fraud Investigations 
When an organization wants to investigate facts, causes and responsibilities for an event, 
where there is suspicion of white-collar crime, the investigation can be carried out by fraud 
examiners. A private investigation can comprise elements of intelligence work, detective 
work and analytic work, as we know it from police work. Characteristics that can be attributed 
to private investigations include a serious and unusual event, an extra-ordinary examination to 
find out what happened or why it did not happen, develop explanations, and suggest actions 
towards individuals and changes in systems and practices. 
Fraud examination as intelligence is systematic and goal-oriented collection of data, which is 
transformed and processed according to a determined approach to uncover suspects’ 
capacities, dispositions and purpose, so as to improve disclosure and clarification. Risk-based 
techniques can be applied to get an overview of departments, groups and individuals, and how 
they act. Intelligence can also be defined as the result of the collection and assessment of 
information about potential fraud and potential suspects by default, to evaluate and draw 
conclusions about the risk situation, point out potential problems and identify potential 
criminal activity with the intent to pursue the matter. 
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Fraud examination as investigation is targeted at collection of information to confirm or 
disconfirm an action or omission of action, and work to prove both guilt and innocence. Fraud 
examiners need to prepare evidence and documents so that they appropriately can serve as a 
basis for managerial assessment of the case. Investigation is about to seek, to collect, and to 
secure evidence that substantiates the merits in its true context, so that the accused’s or 
suspect’s guilt as well as innocence is evaluated.  
Fraud examination as analysis is the process of breaking down a complex topic or subject to 
smaller parts to improve understanding and insight. Analysis means to create meaning out of 
data by processing, interpreting, reorganizing and seeking a structure from the gathered 
material. To analyze is to ask questions; what, where, how, who, when, which and why. What 
has happened? Where did it happen? How has it happened? Who may have done what? When 
did it happen? Which sequence of events is most likely? Why did it happen? How can such 
events be prevented in the future? 
 
Need for Private Investigations 
Recent years have seen an increasing use of investigation in terms of the assessment of 
financial irregularities. This inquiry form – which primarily takes place in public and private 
companies – aims to uncover failing internal controls and any financial irregularities such as 
corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion and other forms of economic crime. Such is 
investigations are sometimes conducted as part of the ordinary or extraordinary audit, or as 
separate studies conducted by private law firms, accounting firms, consulting firms or other 
kinds of professional services firms. The investigation examines internal affairs of a business 
or relationships between entities. The results of an investigation are presented in an 
examination report. An examination report’s purpose is to help shed light and insight into a 
complex matter, which is controversial in some ways. 
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Most businesses experience from time to time incidents and negative events. Normally such 
incidents are handled by internally checking what might have happened, then try to establish 
the facts, before measures are taken to correct the situation. In some cases, however, 
organizations find that there is a need to hire third parties to carry out inquiries, for example 
because special expertise is required or complete independence has to be secured. The client 
gets in contact with external resources that are known and recommended. A mandate for the 
examination is developed, which describes what events the client wants to get examined, what 
questions the client wants to get answered, what reviews the client want to be made, and what 
hypotheses the client wants to get tested. The mandate defines a time limit applicable to the 
conduct of the mission. In addition, a budget is agreed upon between client and examiner, 
especially when there is an external fraud examiner hired by a client organization. 
Wells (2003) argued that formal education in the fraud examination field is new and limited, 
and Anders (2006) suggests that certified fraud examiners should provide free resources to 
general public. Certification of fraud examiners was created in response to the demand for 
expertise in fraud prevention and detection (Morgan and Nix, 2003). Fraud examiners in the 
US can have varying backgrounds. It is not only lawyers, auditors and consultants who work 
as private investigators. Sociologists and criminologists can also take on tasks as detectives. 
Examples are mentioned by Kennedy (2013), who writes about forensic sociology and 
criminology. Fraud examiners provide a broad range of services to businesses and 
governmental agencies as either employees or independent consultants (ACFE, 2008). A 
fraud examiner may assist in a fraud investigation by procuring evidence, taking statements, 
and writing reports (Machen and Richards, 2004).Within the broad category of fraud 
examiners are forensic accountants who specialize in a unique brand of accounting that 
departs from the traditional methods employed in the accounting field (Machen and Richards, 
2004). 
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Blame Game Hypothesis 
The market for private financial crime investigations by fraud examiners has grown in 
Norway in recent years. Several reasons can be found for this growth. First, compliance by 
business organizations has become an important issue, especially for corporations trading 
their stocks on stock exchanges both domestically and abroad. Detecting and preventing 
financial crime has thus become critical. Second, suspicions of financial crime generally and 
white-collar crime in particular will harm business reputation, making it imperative to find out 
what actually happened. Third, Norwegian police does often not have the capacity and 
competence to investigate complicated business irregularities. Fourth, corporate social 
responsibility has become an issue on the board agenda in many organizations, where ethical 
guidelines, anti-bribery activities and other crime-related topics are of increasing importance. 
Finally, innocent yet suspected individuals, especially when exposed in the media, deserve a 
fair investigation to prove their innocence.  
However, the blame game hypothesis suggests that suspected individuals do not necessarily 
become subject to a fair investigation by private examiners and financial crime specialists. In 
police investigations, it is equally important to prove innocence as to prove guilt. In the 
charter for Norwegian criminal investigations, it is stated that police officers should put just as 
much effort into proving innocence as into proving guilt. Even when victims and others 
expect public prosecution, only individuals where police investigations have found sufficient 
evidence, will be prosecuted in court. 
This may be different in private investigations. Financial crime specialists claim to have 
found the facts and the responsible person(s) for a negative event or incident. They may not 
have practiced an open mind. They may have been pointed in a specific direction by the 
client, and they may have only one lead which was to be verified in the investigation. The 
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client pays sometimes for a desired result. The client defines a mandate, and the investigation 
has to be carried out according to the mandate. To make a contribution in the investigation 
report, investigators have to describe some findings related to facts and causes. 
There are two steps of looking for causal explanations in private investigations. The first step 
is concerned with the mandate, where investigative focus is defined. The second step is 
concerned with findings, where potential suspects are identified. Often, it can be perceived as 
a blame game by individuals who are suspected of financial crime. Investigators are told by 
suspects: “You should not blame me for what happened!” 
Research on organizational justice and social accounts focuses on how explanations of 
negative events are publicly communicated to others. Explanations affect outcomes such as 
trust in the organization, feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, frustration, and stress. Suspects 
find it unfear, especially when suspicions develop into more or less grounded accusations. Of 
course, this can happen in police investigations as well. 
Lack of causal accounts increase disapproval ratings of the harm done by placing the blame 
for harmful acts on others. For example, by attributing corruption to an executive in the 
organization as a rotten apple, the suspect will feel betrayed by other executives who, in his 
opinion, belong to the rotten apple basket.  
External attributions place the cause of a negative event on external factors, absolving the 
account giver and investigation client from personal responsibility. However, unstable 
attributions suggest that the cause of the negative event is unlikely to persist over time, and as 
such mitigate the severity of the predicament. Uncontrollable attributions suggest that the 
cause of the event is not within the control of the attributor, further removing any blame or 
responsibility for the unjust act from the account giver (Lee and Robinson, 2000). 
The reasons for private investigations include lack of facts and lack of accountability. Nobody 
will blame oneself for the negative event. The account giver, the private investigator, absolves 
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others from the blame and responsibility for the negative event. Even in cases of self-blame, 
investigations are required to ensure that the self-blame is justified. Self-blame is attributing a 
negative event to one’s behavior or disposition (Lee and Robinson, 2000).  
In a principal-agent perspective, attributions for negative events may deflect blame away from 
the real perpetrators. Investigators are motivated to assume power and to project control over 
causal relationships. This motivation to appear in control might lead the account giver to use 
internal and controllable attributions in their accounts. Such motivation might also lead the 
investigator to use controllable attributions in their accounts by deflecting blame. To blame 
others is simply attractive when a negative event has occurred. 
The blame game includes not only internal and external attributions. Also relations can be 
blamed. Eberly et al. (2011) found that an employee does not solely blame her own abilities 
and skills for the negative event, nor does she attribute blame solely to her supervisor. Instead, 
she attributes the failure to the poor interaction she had with her supervisor – a feature of their 
relationship. Furthermore, the employee may blame being passed over a promotion on a lack 
of connections with key constituents in the organization or on low network centrality. In the 
blame game, relational attribution is problematic, as investigators will find it inconvenient to 
blame an individual as self in relation to other. Responsibility for a negative event is assigned 
to an individual or individuals, and not to a relationship or relationships. 
Shepherd et al. (2011) argue that the building blocks of an informed culture are encouraging 
members to report errors and near misses; to apportion blame justly when something goes 
wrong; and to flexibly and swiftly learn by reconfiguring assumptions, frameworks, and 
actions. However, to protect themselves from criticism, executives and other individuals in an 
organization often engage in impression management that deflects blame to others.  
The blame game can be explained in terms of negative events that are attributed to individuals 
who account givers would like to blame. People have a tendency to make sense of events by 
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acting as naïve psychologists. When confronted with events, people seek to determine their 
causes. For example, couples in marriages sometimes play the blame game by determining the 
other spouse as the cause. Causality in terms of cause-and-effect relationships seems easy to 
conclude when events occur.  
The blame game hypothesis can be derived from attribution theory (Eberly et al., 2011) as 
well as behavioral decision making theory, which posits that decision makers are predictably 
biased by the interaction of the context and specific cognitive mechanisms (Hammond et al., 
1998; Kahnemann, 2011). Behavioral decision making has identified an array of cognitive 
mechanisms that may disturb investigators’ judgment. A bias can occur among private 
investigators based on client mandate and available resources in fraud investigations, where 
anchoring of suspicion can be misplaced. Furthermore, the primacy effect is a tendency for 
the first items presented in a series to be remembered better or more easily, while affirmation 
bias means to interpret information in a way consistent with existing beliefs. If the client has 
strong beliefs in one way or the other, this will manifest itself both in the mandate and in 
expectations. Similarly, the tunnel view sometimes experienced in police investigations imply 
that detectives go for the light at the end of the tunnel, rather than to look at what is outside 
the tunnel. 
 
Research Method 
Private investigations in Norway are carried out by auditing firms such as BDO, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC, as well as by law firms such as Kvale, Lynx and 
Wiersholm. Fraud examiners in these firms are typically trained as auditors, lawyers and 
police detectives. In a country of five million people, there are about one hundred partners and 
associates in these firms who have fraud investigations as their main occupation. In addition, 
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larger banks, insurance firms, oil companies and other organizations have internal 
investigation departments.  
This research is about criminal offences, not civil cases. An estimated ten private 
investigations become publicly known in Norway per year. Out of this number, the current 
research was able to obtain twenty-eight investigation reports from recent years. Access to 
most investigation reports was denied by the investigation contractor, the client, where 
typically the investigation took place. Based on the accessed investigation reports, this article 
attempts to identify some characteristics of investigation reports listed in Table 1.  
First in Table 1, the case name is mentioned. Adecco is a business firm, Ahus is a public 
hospital, while Briskeby is a football stadium. Eckbo is a family foundation, Fadderbarna is a 
non-government organization for children care, Forsvaret is the Army, while Furuheim is a 
church foundation running homes for elderly. Next in the table, literature reference to 
investigation reports is listed, using the investigating firm as reference. Suspicion causing the 
investigation is listed in the next column. Finally, the number of pages in the investigation 
report is listed. 
Making private investigation reports publicly known – as those listed in the table – serves a 
number of important purposes. Firstly, whistle-blowers receive the required recognition they 
deserve, and future whistle-blowers can observe that whistle-blowing matters. Next, published 
investigations can have a preventive effect on potential white-collar criminals and also make 
white-collar criminals terminate their criminal activities. Publishing enables practical focus 
and attention to morale and ethics, where it becomes visible what is acceptable and what is 
not. Publishing increases the extent of organizational transparency. Publishing enables 
learning by other organizations that could have ended up in the same situation. When 
corruption scandals such as the one involving global fertilizer Yara was in the media for 
weeks and months, the public expects to learn about the truth. Publication can generally lead 
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to new insights about causes of financial crime, and thereby increase awareness among 
decision makers in society. Finally, available investigation reports can help improve teaching 
and research at universities. Despite all these good reasons, most private investigations by 
fraud examiners lead to secrecy of reports. 
 
# Case Investigator Suspicion  Pages 
1 Adecco 
Nursing and cleaning 
services business 
Wiersholm (2011) 
law firm 
Exploitation of work force in 
nursing home in terms of low 
wages and inhuman working 
hours 
22 
2 Ahus 
Public hospital 
PwC (2013a) 
auditing firm 
Buying expensive 
geographical information 
system services 
15 
3 Briskeby 
Football stadium 
Lynx (2011) law 
firm 
Over charging for 
construction work at football 
stadium 
267 
4 Eckbo 
Family foundation 
Dobrowen and 
Klepp (2009) law 
firm 
Executives in ideal 
foundation for personal gain 
119 
5 Fadderbarna 
NGO for children 
BDO (2011) 
auditing firm 
Excessive administration 
costs in NGO 
46 
6 Forsvaret 
Army 
Dalseide (2006) Suspected corruption at 
procurement of information 
technology 
184 
7 Furuheim 
Church foundation 
Dalane and Olsen 
(2006) law firm 
Executives in church 
foundation for personal gain 
164 
8 Gassnova 
Carbon capture and 
storage 
BDO (2013) 
auditing firm 
Irregular procurement 
procedures by employees 
27 
9 Halden Ishall 
Sports Ice Arena 
KPMG (2012) 
auditing firm 
Excessive cost overrun in 
reconstruction 
121 
10 Halden kommune 
City of Halden 
Gjørv and Lund 
(2013) 
Manager in department of 
planning and construction 
suspected of corruption 
46 
11 Kragerø Fjordbåtselskap 
Shipping company 
Deloitte (2012) Chief executive suspected of 
abuse of company funds 
109 
12 Langemyhr 
Construction company 
PwC (2008a) 
auditing firm 
Fraud by overbilling city 
work in hours 
26 
13 Lindeberg 
Nursing home 
Kommune-
revisjonen (2013) 
Outside authority of 
personnel 
92 
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auditing service 
14 Lunde Group 
Transportation company 
Bie (2012) law 
firm 
Fraud and tax evasion for 30 
million US dollars 
86 
15 Moskvaskolen 
Norwegian school in 
Moskau 
Ernst & Young 
(2013) auditing 
firm 
Private living expenses for 
dean covered by school 
38 
16 Norges Fotballforbund 
Football association 
Lynx (2013) law 
firm 
Football players changing 
clubs without clubs paying 
transfer money 
48 
17 Norsk Tipping 
Public betting firm 
Deloitte (2010) 
auditing firm 
CEO got his house and 
property maintained for free 
by the firm 
61 
18 Oslo Vei 
Road construction 
company 
Kvale (2013) law 
firm 
Chairman and CEO suspected 
of fraud after bankruptcy  
53 
19 Romerike Vannverk 
Public water supply 
Distrikts-
revisjonen (2007) 
Chief executive suspected of 
corruption and embezzlement 
555 
20 Samferdselsetaten 
Public transportation 
PwC (2007) Suspicion of kickbacks from 
taxi owners for licenses 
88 
21 Spania 
City of Oslo project in 
Spain 
PwC (2009) 
auditing firm 
Abuse of public money spent 
on friends in Spain to build a 
local hospital for Norwegians 
92 
22 Stangeskovene 
Private forest property 
Roscher and Berg 
(2013) 
Board members controlling 
share sales 
94 
23 Sykehuset Innlandet 
Hospital 
Davidsen and 
Sandvik (2011) 
Chief executive suspected of 
employment violations 
15 
24 Terra 
Cities investing in bonds 
PwC (2008b) 
auditing firm 
Outside authority of city 
management 
52 
25 Troms Kraft 
Power supply company 
Nergaard (2013a-
c) consulting firm 
Accounting manipulation in 
subsidiary and illegal political 
party support 
663 
26 Tyrkia 
City of Stavanger project 
for children 
PwC (2013b) 
auditing firm 
Smuggling of adopted 
children out of Turkey 
financed by the city of 
Stavanger 
14 
27 Undervisningsbygg 
School maintenance 
agency 
Kommune-
revisjonen 
(2006a, 2006b) 
auditing service 
Fraud by property managers 
in the City of Oslo 
36 
28 Verdibanken 
Religious bank 
Wiersholm (2012) 
law firm 
Investment fraud by bank 
executive 
5 
Table 1: Characteristics of reports from fraud examinations by private investigators 
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The data was collected by obtaining as many investigation reports as possible. Only a fraction 
of investigation reports were available. This is because it was unknown to the researchers 
where private investigations had taken place, as only investigations somehow mentioned in 
the media were recognizable to the researchers. Fraud examiners denied disclosure of where 
they had conducted investigations. Only those disclosed by journalists were known to the 
researchers. When approaching both clients and examiners to get access to investigation 
reports, we were very often denied insight. There are indeed many reasons why most 
investigation reports are kept a secret. Here are some of our findings from denial of insight 
into examination reports experienced by the researchers and confirmed in emails from 
denying parties: 
1. Damage. The examination report contains business secrets which competitors might 
take advantage of, and thus cause damage to the business in its markets 
2. Confidentiality. Lawyers are subject to confidentiality similar to medical doctors and 
psychologists.  
3. Suspicion. Some investigation reports are very comprehensive and also describe 
circumstances for which the suspect was never prosecuted.  
4. Mistakes. Some investigation reports have serious flaws, mistakes and shortcomings.  
5. Accusations. The investigation report has a number of unfounded accusations against 
individual persons, who receive the blame, without being able to defend themselves.  
6. Unsuccessful. The private investigation by fraud examiners was unsuccessful and a 
failure. Investigators did not find answers to the questions that initiated the inquiry, 
and they did not solve problems as expected by the client.  
7. Misconduct. The private investigation was a failure, because investigators showed 
misconduct in their work.  
8. Unreadable. Some private investigation reports are simply not readable.  
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9. Disagreement. Among owners of the organization, there might have been agreement 
to conduct a private investigation, but agreement can be lacking afterwards concerning 
publication of the investigation report.  
10. Termination. Like all other kinds of projects, some investigation projects are 
terminated before completion. One reason for early termination is the lack of 
relevance to the organization. Another reason is that the project was premature. A 
third reason might be that the project went on in a completely wrong direction.  
11. Confidentiality. Many individuals have provided valuable and sensitive information to 
private detectives under the assumption and with the promise that their information 
will never be disclosed.  
12. Evidence. Sometimes, private investigations are followed by police investigations, 
which may or may not lead to prosecution and court ruling. If important evidence is 
leaked to the public, it can harm the court process, both for the prosecutor and for the 
defendant.  
13. Work. There is too much work in filing a complaint or case to the police. The police 
always ask for more information, more documents and more meetings. 
Our data collection procedure is biased towards investigations in the public sector, because 
misconduct in public sector becomes more easily accessible to investigative journalists than 
do misconduct in the private sector. 
 
Research Findings 
The blame game hypothesis suggests that individuals are blamed with a negative event – in 
our context suspicion of white-collar crime – after private investigators have examined facts 
and causes. It is interesting and relevant to study the usefulness of applying the blame game 
hypothesis towards an understanding of allegations and subsequent outcomes. This might help 
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to address concerns about the potential for miscarriage of justice or even loss of job or 
reputation in such cases. 
Table 2 lists individuals blamed, reasons for blame and blame consequence for individuals 
investigated by fraud examiners. Not all individuals in the list were victims of the blame 
game. Some were real suspects and later convicted to jail sentence because of financial crime. 
This was the case in Furuheim, Romerike and Undervisningsbygg. Of course, even a 
conviction is not necessarily an accurate indicator of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, we 
cannot draw conclusions on the motive of the accuser based on the outcome of the case. 
Then there are six no-consequence cases. In one case, Ahus, there is no individual blamed, but 
rather a supplier. In all remaining cases, somebody got the blame. Seven of them had to leave 
their positions, even though there was no real proof or evidence. Thus, more than half of all 
individuals investigated by fraud examiners became potential victims of the blame game. 
Nothing was proven, there were no evidence, but media speculation and job loss for some, 
turned them into potential victims of the blame game hypothesis.  
For example, Mr. Langemyhr was running a successful construction company until a 
customer – the city of Oslo – asked for a private investigation into some invoices. Langemyhr 
went bankrupt and the case against him was dismissed in court many years later. 
 
# Case Individuals 
Blamed 
Reasons for 
Blame 
Blame 
Consequence 
1 Adecco 
Nursing and cleaning 
services business 
Manager for 
Adecco Health 
Breaking work 
hour laws for 
employees 
Manager left 
company 
2 Ahus 
Public hospital 
Supplier of digital 
map services 
Over-charge of 
map services 
Back-payment of 
map charges 
3 Briskeby 
Football stadium 
Managers of 
construction 
Budget overruns 
in construction 
Media blame of 
two managers 
4 Eckbo 
Family foundation 
Board members Excessive fees 
and expenses 
No consequence 
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5 Fadderbarna 
NGO for children 
Management Excessive 
administrative 
expenses 
No consequence 
6 Forsvaret 
Army 
Managers at 
supplier Siemens 
Corruption of 
army officials 
Siemens 
executive left 
company 
7 Furuheim 
Church foundation 
Board members Property 
arrangement for 
private gain 
Board members 
convicted to jail 
sentence 
8 Gassnova 
Carbon capture and 
storage 
Nobody Procurement No consequence 
9 Halden Ishall 
Sports Ice Arena 
Manager of ice 
arena 
Abuse of public 
money 
No consequence 
10 Halden kommune 
City of Halden 
Manager of 
planning office 
Corruption of 
planning officer 
Planning manager 
in media 
11 Kragerø Fjordbåtselskap 
Shipping company 
Chief executive Conflict with the 
board 
Chief executive 
left company 
12 Langemyhr 
Construction company 
Manager of 
construction 
company 
City officials felt 
over-charged by 
company 
Prosecuted, but 
case dismissed 
13 Lindeberg 
Nursing home 
Manager Breaking work 
hour laws for 
employees 
No consequence 
14 Lunde Group 
Transportation company 
Owner Bankruptcy Owner prosecuted 
in court 
15 Moskvaskolen 
Norwegian school in 
Moskau 
Dean at school Free lodging Dean and vice 
dean 
16 Norges Fotballforbund 
Football association 
Club managers No payment to 
previous clubs 
No consequence 
17 Norsk Tipping 
Public betting firm 
President of 
company 
Abuse of power 
for personal 
benefit 
President left 
company 
18 Oslo Vei 
Road construction 
company 
Managers Bankruptcy Media blame of 
three managers 
19 Romerike Vannverk 
Public water supply 
President Personal expenses 
paid by company 
President 
convicted to jail 
sentence 
20 Samferdselsetaten 
Public transportation 
City manager for 
taxi licenses 
Not equal 
opportunity for 
taxi owners 
City manager left 
position 
21 Spania City manager for Unsuccessful City manager left 
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City of Oslo project in 
Spain 
elderly investment in 
Spain 
position 
22 Stangeskovene 
Private forest property 
Board members Shares sold 
within family 
Board members 
23 Sykehuset Innlandet 
Hospital 
Hospital 
executive 
Tough 
management style 
Media blame of 
executive 
24 Terra 
Cities investing in bonds 
City executive Failed 
investments 
Media blame of 
executive 
25 Troms Kraft 
Power supply company 
Subsidiary 
executive 
Manipulation of 
accounting 
numbers 
Executive under 
police 
investigation 
26 Tyrkia 
City of Stavanger project 
for children 
Private 
investigator 
Smuggling 
children by 
corruption 
Media blame of 
private 
investigator 
27 Undervisningsbygg 
School maintenance 
agency 
Contract manager Corruption Contract manager 
sentenced to jail 
28 Verdibanken 
Religious bank 
Managing 
director 
Ignorance of 
board decisions 
Managing 
director left 
company 
Table 2: Blame game after reports from fraud examinations by private investigators 
 
All twenty-eight investigation reports listed in the table were subject to case studies. Here are 
some examples to illustrate what the cases are about:  
1. Briskeby Stadion Case. Two executives from private sector received the blame from 
fraud examiner Lynx (2011), while some identified bureaucrats and politicians are the 
really responsible persons. However, since politicians and bureaucrats initiated the 
investigation, they could point examiners in the direction of two construction 
executives. 
2. Kragerø Ferry Boat Case. Deloitte (2012) investigated suspicions against the 
managing director, but it was all about a conflict between board members. The 
managing director had to leave. 
3. Langemyhr Case. Mr. Langemyhr owned a successful construction company and did 
work for the City of Oslo. The City of Oslo hired PwC (2008a) to investigate whether 
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Langemyhr was charging too much. PwC concluded that there was substantial over-
billing. The City of Oslo handed over the examination report to the police, which 
started its own investigation. The police decided to prosecute Langemyhr. In the 
district court of Oslo, the case was dismissed, because there was lack of evidence. Six 
years had then passed with massive press coverage and bankruptcy of his firm. 
Langemyhr sued the city, and he was reimbursed. The problem here was probably 
fraud examiners’ too strong belief in over-charging by Langemyhr without evidence. 
In the mandate, the blame was already on suspicion of “overbilling, use of names as 
fictive hourly workers, theft of material” (PwC, 2008a: 3), and there was no mention 
of the city side of responsibility. PwC (2008a) confirmed all suspicions as facts in 
their report. 
4. Moskva School Case. A Norwegian high school established a subsidiary in Moskva 
where they had an apartment, which the dean used for free, and other private expenses 
were covered by the school. However, board members were never investigated by 
Ernst & Young (2013), including politicians responsible for the project. In August 
2014, the police dismissed the case, but in the meantime the school dean lost his job 
because investigators from Ernst & Young (2013: 52) had recommended the year 
before that “employee consequences for individuals” should be implemented and 
“police reporting” should take place. 
5. Norsk Tipping Case. The public betting firm had a CEO whose garden was taken care 
of by the firm. This was according to an agreement, but Deloitte’s (2010) investigation 
led to the fall of the CEO. 
6. Spania Case. Politicians decided to build a home for elderly Norwegians in Spain. 
Millions were spent, but there was never a home built. A city manager was blamed 
and had to leave his job after investigation by PwC (2009). 
19 
 
7. Terra Case. Some small towns in Norway had the potential of becoming rich because 
they have great waterfall producing electric power. Instead of waiting for future utility 
income, they made investments based on future revenue. Investments were lost, and so 
were future revenues. The administration was blamed, not city politicians, by 
examiners from PwC (2008b). 
8. Troms Kraft Case. Board and management initiated investigations focused on 
subsidiaries and other pre-defined themes by Nergaard (2013a-c). 
9. Tyrkia Case. Child care in the city of Stavanger smuggled children out of Turkey by 
the help of a private investigator, who later received the blame by PwC (2013). 
10. Verdibanken Case. Because of risky investments by the bank, the CEO had to leave 
his post after examination by law firm Wiershom (2012), even though it all had been 
approved by the board. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of private investigations is to clarify facts, analyze events, identify reasons for 
incidents, evaluate whether there is a systems failure, and if required, propose measures and 
consider the responsibility of individuals. In fraud examinations, focus of examiners is on 
potential financial crime. One or multiple examiners are appointed to collect and go through 
an often large stack of documentation. The reason for an investigation is often suspicions that 
form the basis for hypotheses of fraud. Hypotheses typically imply that business owners, 
directors, managers or employees are responsible for unacceptable circumstances. To clarify 
the situation, an extraordinary examination is often a suitable solution.  
Examiners have an independent position in relation to the client as principal and the 
principal’s command authority. Independence is also needed in relation to all parties involved 
in the investigation. If there is a lawyer who conducts the investigation, it is important that the 
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client understands that the investigation does not form part of any lawyer’s ongoing legal 
quest for the client. Thus, the regular attorney-client privilege does not apply. The privilege 
ensures that a client may provide information to his or her attorney, in confidence, with the 
knowledge that such information is protected, and neither the client nor the attorney may be 
forced to disclose the information that has been shared to their judicial adversaries (Kopon 
and Sungaila, 2012). Since the lawyer acts as an examiner, and not as an attorney, the 
attorney-client privilege is not present in private investigations. The same applies to an 
auditor who undertakes an investigation mission.  
A lawyer is a person doing legal work for clients. However, a lawyer is a knowledge worker, 
who combines legal insights with client problems to find a good or even optimal solution to 
problems (Gottschalk, 2014). Therefore, some lawyers take the role of fraud examiner as well. 
One of the tasks of internal auditors is to conduct reviews and inspections.  For them, an 
investigation is an independent and extraordinary inquiry which aims to identify the facts in 
order to answer a defined and limited mandate. The investigation may include 
recommendations, and will form the basis for judgments and decisions. An investigation into 
suspicions of fraud is also a comparison of the facts with the legal framework. 
Investigation is characterized by professions as accountants, lawyers, economists, former 
police detectives, and engineers conducting research. The typical investigation commission in 
Norway has a budget of two hundred thousand US dollars. Some investigation missions are 
small and performed for twenty or thirty thousand US dollars. The investigation of Statoil-
Hydro in 2007 had fraud examination costs of thirty million US dollars; the investigation of 
Yara in 2011 had costs of ten million US dollars; while the investigation of Troms Kraft in 
2013 had costs of six million US dollars. Chairman Inge K. Hansen in Troms Kraft refused to 
pay an additional bill of two million US dollars from fraud examiner Leiv Nergaard, as the 
agreed limit was six million (Grande, 2013). 
21 
 
Independence for the examiner is not just an issue in relation to the client and people who get 
in touch with the investigation. For example, a lawyer in a law firm cannot take on a fraud 
examination assignment if another lawyer in the same firm already has other roles in relation 
to the client or people who get in touch with the investigation. A colleague in the law firm 
may already have taken the role as advisor and defense attorney for one of the executives who 
are suspected of misconduct and possible white-collar crime. Is the CEO suspected of 
misconduct and an attorney in a law firm has agreed to take the case; then another lawyer in 
the same firm cannot undertake to investigate fraud, where the CEO might have been 
involved. When a lawyer undertakes to defend a white-collar for suspected economic crime, 
then the attorney is sometimes called a white-collar crime lawyer. Role mixture must not only 
be avoided in law firms. The same applies to other professional services firms such as audit 
firms and consultancies (Gottschalk, 2014). 
This research article is not about naming and shaming individuals and companies. It is about 
empirical study, where there is no reason to anonymize fraud examiners. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has presented exploratory research into private investigations by fraud examiners. 
More than half of all private investigations conclude by blaming someone who could not 
always defend himself or herself. The blame game seems to have occurred both when the 
client – who paid for the work – pointed the investigator in a specific direction, and when the 
investigator only had one hypothesis about causality for a negative event. Suspected 
individuals did not always become subject to a fair investigation by private examiners and 
financial crime specialists. 
The blame game hypothesis is all about placing the blame for harmful acts on others. It is all 
about removing any blame or responsibility for the unjust from the client who pays for the 
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investigation. Nobody will blame oneself for a negative event. Self-blame is very rare. The 
blame game was explained in terms of negative events that are attributed to individuals who 
the contractor or account giver would like to blame. 
However, since this is exploratory and qualitative research, this article does not at all provide 
sufficient support for the blame game hypothesis in private investigations of white-collar 
crime suspicions. Rather, this article has contributed to insights into problems in private 
investigations by applying the blame game hypothesis.  
Thus there are ample avenues for future research. In terms of theoretical contribution, both 
attribution theory and decision bias theory should be explored in future research. In terms of 
practical implications, private investigators should be aware of the pitfalls discussed in this 
article. Certified fraud examiners are bound by a code of ethics that prevents them from being 
pointed in a specific direction by the client. The client cannot pay for a desired result. 
However, it may seem that these things are happening. The client may ask the examination 
team to investigate Person A (and not Person B), but the client may not ask for the examiners 
to conclude that Person A is guilty of X. Thus, even if only one idea is presented, this does 
not mean that a person will automatically be found guilty. However, there remains the issue 
whether or not it is acceptable that Person B is left out of the investigation focus. Objectivity 
here means that the investigator should look for the truth. If the truth about a negative event is 
found by investigating Person B, maybe the examiner should be entitled to investigate that 
person. 
The research findings section may seem to be basically a table of raw data. More analysis is 
needed. Also, interviews with clients, examiners and victims might help enrich the empirical 
basis for analysis. At the start of this article, two key aims were suggested, i.e. presenting the 
result from a study of reports and, in doing so to evaluate the blame game hypothesis. These 
two aims were not completely achieved. To achieve these aims, we need a more in depth 
23 
 
analysis of the raw data which was presented in the findings section. The themes needed to be 
drawn out of this data include how many resulted in prosecution, who were the most likely to 
be accused, who were the most likely to make allegations, and why did they make allegations. 
An interesting question is whether the fraud examiner can be held responsible for individuals 
who become potential victims. Media speculation and job loss turn investigated individuals 
into victims of a fraud examination. Some examiners may argue that the problem lies 
elsewhere (i.e., media). Some examiners may argue that it is outside of the control of the 
investigator if other events lead to negative outcomes for the accused individual. 
Future research has to further explore the usefulness of applying the blame game hypothesis 
towards an understanding of negative allegations and subsequent outcomes. It needs to 
address concerns about the potential for a miscarriage of justice or even loss of job or 
reputation in such cases. It should study what is fair and what is unfair, what is acceptable and 
what is unacceptable. False allegations need to be prevented from having consequences for 
individuals. 
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